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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee, 
v. 
VICTORIA FANTON, 
Appellant 
Court of Appeals No.: 20150300 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78A-4-103(2)(e) and UT. 
R. APP. P. 3 over this appeal from the Judgment, Sentence, S tqy of Execution of Sentence, Order of 
Probation and Restitution, and Commitment, dated April 7, 2015, in Criminal No. 141500785; 
Appellate Case No. 20150300, and the Judgment, Sentence, Stqy of Execution of Sentence, and Order 
of Probation dated April 7, 2015, in Criminal No. 141500783; Appellate Case No. 20150301 
(collectively the "Judgments"), by the Honorable Keith Barnes of the Fifth District Court, 
Iron County, State of Utah, which Judgments sentenced Fanton to a prison term of one to 
fifteen (1-15) years on each count, with a stay of the sentence in favor of jail time and 
probation. A copy of the Judgments are both attached hereto as Addendum "A" and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
ISSUE I: 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying Fantonj- request to seroe 
her remaining suspended sentence (approximate/y 184 df!YS) in three or four-dt!J 
weekends so as to enable her to provide child care for her children? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This court "traditionally afford[s] the trial court wide 
latitude and discretion in sentencing." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, ,r 8, 40 P.3d 626. ''We will 
reverse only if we detennine that a sentencing court has exceeded its permitted range of 
discretion, or, stated differently, if we detennine that the trial court has 'failed to consider all 
legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that e~ceeds legally prescribed limits."' State v. 
Moreno, 2005 UT App 200, ,rs, 113 P.3d 992, dting State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah 
App. 1993). "Moreover, our decision is informed by the understanding that 'the exercise of 
discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the [trial] court and 
[we] can properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the 
view adopted by the trial court." Moreno at ,rs, dting Nuttall at 456 (first and third alterations 
in original)( quotations and citation omitted). 
PRESERVATION: At the sentencing herein, Fanton requested that she be allowed 
to serve her remaining suspended sentence of one hundred and eighty-four (184) days, in 
three (3) or four ( 4) day weekends in the Iron County Jail so as to enable her to care for her 
minor children. The trial court denied such argument indicating that the charge was too 
severe to allow such leniency. 
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ISSUE II: Was trial counsel ineffective in failing to request that Fanton be transferred to the 
S fate of Michigan to serve her sentence so that her fami/y could help care for her 
children while she was incarcerated? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for 
the first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ,I6, 89 P.3d 
162, citing State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah App. 1998). 
PRESERVATION: Ineffective assistance of counsel claims do not reqwre 
preservation where the record is adequate for review of the issue and the defendant has new 
counsel on appeal. See, State v. Cook, 881 P.2d 913, 915 n. 3 (Utah App 1994)("ineffective 
assistance claims raise for the first time on appeal can only be reviewed in 'unusual ... 
peculiar, narrow circumstances."' (quoting State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 
1991)); State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App. 1991)("Those circumstances exist 
when there is new counsel on appeal and there is an adequate trial record ... "). 
ISSUE III: Was trial counsel inejfettive far failing to request a mental assessment be performed 
on Fanton when the Presentence Investigation report (''PSI'? indicated that she had 
been diagnosed with mental illness; or, alternativefy, did the trial court commit plain 
error when it did not order a mental assessment based upon the PSI? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for 
the first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ,I6, 89 P.3d 
162, citing State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah App. 1998). In State v. Kennedy it states that, 
"[t]he plain error standard of review requires an appellant to show the existence of a harmful 
error that should have been obvious to the district court." Ibid., 2015 UT App. 152, ,I23, 354 
P.3d 775, citing State v. Wate,jield, 2014 UT App 67, ,I18, 322 P.3d 1194. 
PRESERVATION: See, State v. Cook, 881 P.2d 913, 915 n. 3 (Utah App 
1994)("ineffective assistance claims raise for the first time on appeal can only be reviewed in 
3 
'unusual ... peculiar, narrow circumstances.'" (quoting Stale v. Humphries, 818 P .2d 1027, 1029 
(Utah 1991)); State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App. 1991)("Those circumstances 
exist when there is new counsel on appeal and there is an adequate trial record ... "). 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
A. U.S. CONST. VI states as follows: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
B. UTAH CODE ANN. §62A-4-201 states as follows: 
It is in the best interest and welfare of a child to be raised under the care and 
supervision of the child's natural parents. A child's need for a normal family 
life in a permanent home, and for positive, nurturing family relationships is 
usually best met by the child's natural parents. Additionally, the integrity of the 
family unit and the right of parents to conceive and raise their children are 
constitutionally protected. 
C. UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18-1(5) states as follows: 
Before the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of 
the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a 
reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence 
investigation report from the department or information from other sources 
about the defendant. (b) The presentence investigation report shall include: 
... (iii) findings from any screening and any assessment of the offender 
conducted under Section 77-18-1.1; ... (6)(a) The department shall provide the 
presentence investigation report to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant 
if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for review, three 
working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence 
investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the 
department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the 
sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an additional 10 working days to 
resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. 
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D. UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18-1.1(2) states as follows: 
(2) On or after July 1, 2009, the courts of the judicial districts where the Drug 
Offender Reform Act under Section 63M-7-305 is implemented shall, in 
coordination with the local substance abuse authority regarding available 
resources, order offenders convicted of a felony to: (a) participate in a 
screening prior to sentencing; (b) participate in an assessment prior to 
sentencing if the screening indicates an assessment to be appropriate; and (c) 
participate in substance abuse treatment if: (i) the assessment indicates 
treatment to be appropriate; (ii) the court finds treatment to be appropriate for 
the offender; and (iii) the court finds the offender to be an appropriate 
candidate for community-based supervision. 
E. UTAH CODE ANN. §77-28a-1 states as follows: 
The party states, desiring by common action to fully utilize and improve their 
institutional facilities and provide adequate programs for the confinement, 
treatment and rehabilitation of various types of offenders, declare that it is the 
policy of each of the party states to provide such facilities and programs on a 
basis of co-operation with one another, thereby serving the best interests of such 
offenders and of society and effecting economies in capital expenditures and 
operational costs. The purpose of this Compact is to provide for the mutual 
development and execution of such programs of co-operation for the 
confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of offenders with the most 
economical use of human and material resources. 
F. UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6a-501 states as follows: 
As used in this part: (a) "Assessment" means an in-depth clinical interview 
with a licensed mental health therapist: (i) used to determine if a person is in 
need of: (A) substance abuse treatment that is obtained at a substance abuse 
program; (B) an educational series; or (C) a combination of Subsections 
(l)(a)(i)(A) and (B); and (ii) that is approved by the Division of Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105. 
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 29, 2014 Fanton was charged by Infarmation with Aggravated Robbery, 
a first-degree felony, and Theft, a class B misdemeanor. (20150300)1 R0001. In a separate 
Infarmation also filed on December 29, 2014, Fanton was charged with Possession or Use of a 
Controlled Substance, a third-degree felony, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B 
misdemeanor. (20150301) R0001. An Amended Infarmation was filed on January 21, 2015, 
charging Fanton with Robbery, a second-degree felony, and Possession or Use of a 
Controlled Substance, to wit: Heroin, a third-degree felony. (20150300) R0027; (20150301) 
R0024. On January 21, 2015, the Statement of Defendant in Support ofGuil!J Plea and Certificate of 
Counsel and Order ("Plea") was filed. (20150300) R0029. Under the Plea Fanton pied guilty 
to Robbery, a second-degree felony, and Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, to 
wit: Heroin, a third-degree felony. (20150300) R0030; (20150301) R0028. A Pre-Sentence 
Investigation Report was filed on February 23, 2015. (20150300), R0040; (20150301) R0039. 
The Pre-Sentence Investigation Report contained Fanton's mental history indicating that she 
had been diagnosed with PTSD and bi-polar disorder. (20150300) R0043; (20150301) 
R0042. 
On March 24, 2015 sentencing was held in this matter. On April 7, 2015 the 
Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation and Restitution and Commitment 
was entered. (20150300) R0073. In this Judgment Fanton was sentenced to one (1) to 
fifteen (15) years in the Utah State Prison for her conviction of robbery. (20150300) R0074. 
Fanton was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $10,000, a ninety percent (90%) 
1 There are two (2) cases that have been consolidated into this one appeal. 20150300 refers to the record for trial 
court no. -0785 and 20150301 refers to the record for trial court no. -0783. 
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surcharge, and a court security fee in the amount of thirty-three dollars ($33). Id. This 
sentence was to be served concurrently with the sentence in case no. 1415000785. Id. This 
sentence was stayed in favor of probation. (20150300) R007 5. Under the terms of 
probation Fanton was to execute a formal agreement with Adult Probation and Parole and 
report to them as ordered, break no laws during her probation, serve two hundred and 
seventy-two (272) days in the Iron County jail with credit for time served, pay a fine in the 
amount of fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500) plus a court security fee in the amount of thirty-
three dollars ($33) dollars, pay restitution, obtain a substance abuse evaluation and file such 
report with the court within sixty (60) days, reimburse Iron County four hundred dollars 
($400) for her public defender, not use or possess illegal substances, not associate with 
persons who use illegal substances, write a brief plan of what her life would be like in one 
(1), five (5), and ten (10) years from now and give it to her probation officer, maintain full-
time employment or be in full-time school or a combination of both, complete twenty (20) 
hours a week of community service for every week she is not employed, and not reside 
\ 
outside the State of Utah. (20150300) R0077. 
On April 7, 2015 the Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution, and Order of Probation was 
entered. (20150301) R0067. Fanton was sentenced to one (1) to fifteen (15) years in the 
Utah State Prison and ordered to pay a $10,000 fine plus a ninety percent (90%) surcharge 
and court security fee in the amount of thirty-three dollars ($33). This sentence was to be 
served concurrently with the sentence in case no. 1415000783. This sentence was stayed 
and Fanton was ordered to serve 270 days in the county jail and thirty-six (36) months of 
probation thereafter. The conditions of probation were that Fanton would report as ordered 
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to Adult Probation and Parole, commit no law violations, pay the court security fee of thirty-
three dollars ($33), and follow the other terms of probation as set forth in case no. 
141500783. 
On April 13, 2015, the Notice of Appeal and Notice of Substitution of Counsel and 
Withdrawal was filed. (20150300) R0080; (20150301) R0073. Fanton's trial counsel, Jeffery 
E. Slack withdrew and was replaced by Matthew Carling. Id. On May 15, 2015 the court 
received a letter from Fanton asking that her plea be reviewed and that she be released to 
treatment. (20150301) R0087. The Court denied the request on May 12, 2015. (20150301) 
R0091. On May 26, 2015 a hearing was held regarding Fanton's request to withdraw her 
plea. (20150300) R0105; (20150301) R0096. At such hearing the trial court determined that 
her plea was entered voluntarily and that her request to withdraw was not made timely. The 
trial court thus denied her request. Id. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Plea and Sentencing Hearing January 21, 2015 and March 24, 2015 
At the plea hearing the State indicated that it was not seeking prison time, that 
Fanton would cooperate with any prosecution of her co-defendants, and that she was not 
being pressured into entering a guilty plea in both cases. (20150300) R0103:3; (20150301) 
R0097:3. Fanton indicated she was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and was 
taking no medication. Id. at p. 4. Fanton indicated she had no disabilities and nothing 
would interfere with her ability to enter into the agreement. Id. Fanton indicated to the 
court that she had reviewed the Amended Information and the plea agreement. Id. Fanton 
indicated that she understood the terms of the agreements. Id. Fanton pied guilty to the 
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robbery charge and to possession of a controlled substance. Id. at p. 5. The trial court 
found that there was a sufficient factual basis and that Fanton made her pleas knowingly and 
voluntarily. Id. 
B. Sentencing Hearing on March 24, 2015 
Fanton's attorney indicated that he and Fanton had reviewed the PSI. (20150300) 
R104:2; (20150301) R8:2. Fanton's counsel indicated that they had no issues with the PSI 
except the credit for the eighty-six (86) days she had already served. Id. at p. 3. Fanton's 
attorney also argued that Fanton should be allowed to serve her sentence in three or four (3-
4) day blocks of time so that she could care for her children and resolve other legal matters 
still pending in Washington County. Id. The State indicated it did not believe a sentence of 
two hundred and seventy days (270) should be served in three or four (3-4) day blocks and 
declined Fanton's request. Id at p. 4. The trial court then sentenced Fanton to one (1) to 
fifteen (15) years on the robbery charge and a ten thousand dollar ($10,000) fine with a 
ninety percent (90%) surcharge and thirty-three dollars ($33) court security fee and zero (0) 
to five (5) years on the possession charge with a fine of five thousand dollars ($5,000), 
(ninety percent) 90% surcharge and a thirty-three dollar ($33) court security fee. Id. Both 
cases were to run concurrently with one another. Id. The court then stayed such sentences 
in favor of 270 days in the county jail and thirty-six (36) months of probation. Id. As a 
condition of her probation Fanton was given credit for time already served and was ordered 
to pay one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) in fees and a sixty-six dollar ($66) court 
security fee. Id. Fanton was also ordered to pay restitution. Id. Fanton was to pay four 
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hundred dollars ($400) to the Iron County Attorney's Office for the services of her defense 
attorney. Id. Fanton accepted the trial court's terms of probation. Id. at p. 6. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
At Fanton's sentencing she requested that her remaining suspended sentence of one 
hundred and eighty-four (184) days be served in three to four (3-4) day increments so she 
could continue to care for her children. The trial court erred in denying this request because 
it was a mitigating circumstance that should have been considered by the court~ The trial 
court did not even consider this request but just stated it believed it was not appropriate for 
a suspended sentence of that length. This denial violated Fanton's due process rights because 
the court did not act on relevant information in passing sentence. 
Fanton's counsel was also ineffective because he did not request that she be 
transferred to Michigan to serve her sentence so that her family could help care for her 
children and she could continue to have a relationship with them. His failure to do this 
caused his performance to fall below the reasonable objective professional standard and 
prejudiced Fanton because it did not allow her to have family help with her children or be 
able to continue a relationship with them. 
Fanton's counsel was also ineffective for not objecting to the PSI when it indicated 
that Fanton had been diagnosed with PTSD and bi-polar disorder, and he made no request 
for a mental assessment prior to sentencing. This fell below the reasonable objective 
professional standard and prejudiced Fanton because she was sentenced without the trial 
court taking into consideration her mental illnesses. 
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Alternatively, the trial court committed plain error in this matter because it did not 
order that a mental assessment be completed prior to sentencing when it was aware of 
Fanton's mental illnesses after reading the PSI. Its failure to do so prejudiced Fanton 
because a mental assessment and its diagnosis would have greatly impacted her sentence. 
The trial court was aware of the existence of such illnesses and did nothing to further 
investigate them. Thus, Fanton was prejudiced as is discussed further below. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING 
FANTON'S REQUEST TO SERVE HER REMAINING SUSPENDED 
SENTENCE IN THREE OR FOUR DAY WEEKENDS SO SHE 
COULD PROVIDE CHILD CARE FOR HER CHILDREN BECAUSE 
IT DID NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THIS MITIGATING 
CIRCUMSTANCE. 
"Due process 'requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant 
information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence."' State v. Bowers, 2012 UT App. 353, 
,I12, 292 P.3d 711, dting State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985). ''The Sentencing 
Matrix compare[s] a defendant's criminal history assessment' score with the degree of the 
offense of which he ha[s] been convicted." State v. Harory, 2015 UT App 92, ,I3, -- P.3d --, 
dting State v. Egbert, 7 48 P .2d 558, 561-62 (Utah 1987). Harory continues as follows: 
The Sentencing Matrix 'creates a starting point' for sentencing judges by 
'reflect[ing] a recommendation for a typical case,' but judges are not bound by 
the recommendations and are to take both 'aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances' into account, along with other pertinent considerations, 
when making sentencing decisions." Id. at ,I3; see Utah Sentencing 
Commission, 2014 Adult Sentencing and Release Guidelines 1, available at 
http:/www.sentencing.utah.gov. 
Id. "In general, trial courts base sentencing decisions on 'the totality of the circumstances."' 
State v. Sanchez, 2015 UT App 58, iJ9, -- P.3d --, dting State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, ,Il 17, 322 
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P .3d 624. "Although courts must consider all legally relevant factors in making a sentencing 
decision, not all aggravating and mitigating factors are equally important, and [o]ne factor in 
mitigation or aggravation may weigh more than several factors on the opposite scale." Id., 
quoting State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ,r59, 191 P.3d 17 (alteration in original)(citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). "This should not be read to mean that the trial court's 
sentencing decision is beyond review. The trial court is charged with identifying, on the 
record, the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that affect its sentencing decision, 
because '[s]entencing should be conducted with full information and with careful 
deliberation of all relevant factors."' Moreno at ,I10, citing State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1300 
(Utah 1993). "A trial court's failure to discharge this duty will result in the case being 
remanded for resentencing with instructions that the trial court consider all of the 
circumstances relevant to the sentencing decision." Id., citing Strunk at 1300. In State v. 
Beltran-Felix it states that, "Utah case law 'require[s] trial courts to set forth, on the record, 
aggravating and mitigating factors, ... "' Ibid., 922 P.2d 30, 37 (Utah App 1996)(citing State v. 
Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1989); State v. Bell, 754 P.2d 55, 60 (Utah 1988)). 
"[A]ny mitigating or aggravating circumstance found by the trial court must be 
supported by evidence, and the proponent of the circumstance bears the burden of proving 
its existence by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Moreno, 2005 UT App 200, ,r13, 
113 P.3d 992; if. United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 712 (10th Cir.1990). "[A]ggravating 
and mitigating factors are primarily concerned with "the nature and circumstances of the 
crime" and "the defendant's character, background [or] history." State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 
1, ,r105, 63 P.3d 731; UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-207(2)(a)(i-ii). Black's Law Dittionary defines 
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"mitigating circumstances" as "[s]uch as do not constitute a justification or excuse for the 
offense in question, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or 
reducing the degree of moral culpability." Ibid., 6th Edition, West Publishing 1991, p. 693. 
In State v. Undsey the court discusses what makes up an appropriate sentence as 
follows: 
A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant in light 
of his background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of 
society which underlie the criminal justice system." State v. McCJendon, 611 P.2d 
728, 729 (Utah 1980). Thus, "the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, 
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence." UTAH CODE.ANN. §77-18-1(7). 
Ibid, 2014 UT App 288, 340 P.3d 176. ''The Supreme Court of the United States' holding in 
United States v. Booker, 'requires a sentencing court to consider Guideline ranges, but it 
permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well."' U.S. v. 
Hernandez-Castillo, 2007 WL 1302577, *2 (D.N.M. 2007). The Court recognized that "[u]nder 
the new advisory Guideline scheme, 'district courts have a freer hand in determining 
sentences."' Id., dting United States v. Trujillo-Ten-azas, 405 F.3d 814, 819 (10th Cir. 2005). 
Personal family circumstances do allow for a variance in sentencing as is set forth in 
U.S. v. Hernandez-Castillo as follows: 
Hernandez-Castillo argues that, even if his personal family circumstances do 
not warrant a downward departure under the Guidelines, they do counsel for a 
variance from the guideline sentence consistent with the Court's authority 
under United States v. Booker. Hernandez-Castillo has cited a case from the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and one from a district 
court within the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that 
suggest family circumstances are a factor that a sentencing court may consider 
in its analysis under United States v. Booker. See Sentencing Memorandum at 3 
(dting United States v. Bernal-Aveja, 414 F.3d 625, 628-29 (6th 
Cir.2005)(remanding to district court for consideration of whether defendant's 
explanation that he reentered the United States to be closer to his four 
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American-born children residing in Ohio warranted a variance); United States v. 
Galvez-Barrios, 355 F.Supp.2d 958, 964 (E.D.Wisc.2005)(granting a variance 
from the guideline sentence, because, in part, the court "considered it 
significant that defendant returned to the United States to be with and support 
his family, not to commit crimes or for purely economic reasons"). 
The Court agrees that a defendant's family circumstances may reflect upon his 
personal characteristics in a manner that becomes relevant to sentencing. 
Ibid., 2007 WL 1302577. 
In the instant matter, Fanton requested that the trial court allow her to serve her 
sentence in three (3) or four ( 4) day blocks of time so that she could still care for her 
children and maintain her relationship with them. The trial court did not take this request 
into consideration or grant such request when they sentenced Fanton, although such 
information was relevant to this matter. Bowers at if 12. 
Under Harory, Fanton's criminal history assessment score must be compared with the 
degree of the offense of which she has been convicted. Id. at iJ3. Harory indicates that the 
sentencing matrix creates a starting point for the trial judge by giving them a 
recommendation and that they are to take both aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
into account. Id. In general, sentencing decisions are based on the totality of the 
circumstances and all legally relevant factors must be considered. Id. However, any factor of 
mitigating or aggravating circumstances may be given more consideration than another. Id. 
Mitigating factors are those which are concerned with the defendant's character and 
background. Arguelles at if 105. Fanton's child care circumstances are mitigating as she had 
no family to care for her children. By serving three-four (3-4) days at a time, Fanton could 
still care for her children and spend time with them. The young age of her children makes 
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her being with them even more important. This factor should have been considered when it 
was detennined how Fanton's sentence should be served. 
All mitigating or aggravating factors must be placed on the record at sentencing. 
Beltran-Felix at p. 21. The trial court failed to consider the mitigating circumstance of 
Fanton's child care in passing its sentence. At the sentencing hearing Fanton's attorney 
asked the court if she could serve her sentence in three to four day increments so that she 
could care for her children. The court responded that it did not think a two hundred seventy 
(270) day sentence could be served that way and made no consideration of the mitigating 
factor. The court did not discuss or make any other mention of this request on the record. 
It hyper-focused on the length of her sentence to defeat consideration of any other possible 
solution based on the mitigating evidence and request. The court's failure to do so was not 
in compliance with Harof!Y or Beltran-Felix. 
Fanton presented evidence to the court that supported her mitigating circumstances. 
Moreno at ,I13. She told the court why her sentenced should be served in three-four (3-4) day 
increments, yet the court paid no attention. Without any justifiable reason, the court simply 
refused her request. In doing so the court has shown that it is more concerned about one 
factor rather than the totality of the circumstances, failing entirely to consider Fanton's 
children's best interests. 
It is not uncommon for courts to consider family circumstances in sentencing. Booker 
required the trial court herein to consider not only Guideline ranges, but other statutory 
concerns as well. Hernandez-Castillo at *2. The trial court failed to recognize that it had a freer 
hand in determining sentences. Id., dting Trujillo-Te"azas at 819. In Bernal-Avqa, the 6th Circuit 
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remanded to district court for consideration of whether defendant's desire to be closer to his 
four American-born children residing in Ohio warranted a variance. Id. at 628-29. In Galvez-
Barrios, another court granted a variance where the defendant desired to be with and support 
his family, rather than to commit crimes or for purely economic reasons. Id. at 964. In 
Hernandez-Castillo, the Court agreed that a defendant's family circumstances may reflect upon 
his personal characteristics, which is relevant to sentencing. However, the trial court herein 
did not acknowledge the request at all, but rather stated that the sentence was too long to be 
able to order a variance. This is contrary to its duty to consider the totality of the 
circumstances. 
Furthermore, Fanton's sentence must be appropriate based upon her background and 
the crime she committed while it also serves to protect society. Lindsey at ,I12. Fanton 
provided the court with information as to why she would serve her sentence in three or four 
(3-4) day blocks of time and why that should be part of her sentence. Id. While Fanton's 
actual sentence was likely appropriate for her background and crime, her reasons for 
changing how she served her sentence were not considered by the court. The court simply 
said it did not think it was possible to serve her sentence that way. It held no discussion on 
the matter. It did not take into consideration her family circumstances although it is clear 
that courts are directed to do so as a factor in sentencing. See, Bernal-Ave.fa at 628-29; Galvez-
Barrios at 964; Hernandez-Castillo. Family circumstances are grounds for a variation in 
sentencing and thus, the trial court erred in its sentencing of Fanton. 
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II. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE TO 
HAVE FANTON TRANSFERRED TO MICHIGAN TO SERVE HER 
SENTENCE WHERE SHE HAD FAMILY THAT COULD HELP 
WITH HER CHILDREN DURING HER INCARCERATION. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-28a-1 states the purpose of the Interstate Corrections 
Compact ("ICC") between states regarding inmates, as follows: 
The party states, desiring by common action to fully utilize and improve their 
institutional facilities and provide adequate programs for the confinement, 
treatment and rehabilitation of various types of offenders, declare that it is the 
policy of each of the party states to provide such facilities and programs on a 
basis of co-operation with one another, thereby serving the best interests of such 
offenders and of society and effecting economies in capital expenditures and 
operational costs. The purpose of this Compact is to provide for the mutual 
development and execution of such programs of co-operation for the 
confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of offenders with the most 
economical use of human and material resources. 
(Emphasis added). In Glick v. Holden our appellate courts discuss the ICC in more detail as 
follows: 
The ICC was adopted in Utah in 1959 to "improve the range of institutional 
facilities, confinement, treatment, and rehabilitation programs available for 
offenders incarcerated by its member states." Gibson v. Morris, 646 P.2d 733, 
734 (Utah 1982); see UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-28a-1 to -5 (1990). An inmate 
may request a transfer to take advantage of programs offered in other states or 
to be closer to family members. 
Ibid., 889 P.2d 1389, 1390 (UT App. 1995). 
Although located in an area of the code not applicable to these proceedings, a child's 
best interests under UTAH CODE ANN. §62A-4-201 is legally described as follows: 
It is in the best interest and welfare of a child to be raised under the care and 
supervision of the child's natural parents. A child's need for a normal family 
life in a permanent home, and for positive, nurturing family relationships is 
usually best met by the child's natural parents. Additionally, the integrity of the 
family unit and the right of parents to conceive and raise their children are 
constitutionally protected. 
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A parent's fundamental right to have a relationship with their child is stated as follows: 
It is widely recognized that "[a] parent has a fundamental right, protected by 
the Constitution, to sustain his relationship with his child." In re J.P., 648 P.2d 
1364, 1372 (Utah 1982) (quotations and citation omitted); see also QuiJ/oin v. 
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 554, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978) 
(recognizing the relationship between parent and child as constitutionally 
protected). This "freedom of personal choice in matters of ... family life is one 
of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255, 98 S.Ct. at 555 (alteration in original) 
(quotations and citation omitted); see also In re S.A., 2001 UT App 307,if 12, 37 
P.3d 1166 (recognizing parents' interest in the care, custody, and control of 
their children as a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment). Therefore, we must ensure that" 'the custody, care and nurture 
of the child reside first in the parents."' In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1372 (quoting 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438,442, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944) 
State ex. rel A.H., 2004 UT App 39, if 10, 86 P.3d 745. 
A parties' right to the effective assistance of counsel is outlined in Stale v. Houston as 
follows: 
The right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution includes "the right to the effective assistance of counsel." In 
Strickland v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court announced the two-
part test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. First, the defendant must 
show that "his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some 
demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment." Second, the defendant must demonstrate 
"that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." We have 
acknowledged "the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel [ and] 
the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal 
defendant." As a result, "we must indulge in a strong presumption that 
counsel's conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance, and that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy. 
Ibid., 2015 UT 40, if70, 353 P.3d 55. 
In the instant matter, Fanton's counsel was ineffective because he did not ask that 
Fanton be transferred to Michigan so that she could serve her sentence close to family who 
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could help care for her children. Thus, allowing her fundamental right to a relationship with 
the children and the best interests of the children to be ignored. 
Under the ICC, the transferring of Fanton would have properly considered not only 
her best interests, but those of her family, and more particularly her children. UTAH CODE 
ANN. §77-28a-1; Glick at 1390. Fanton's attorney should have requested she be transferred 
to Michigan so she could maintain a relationship with her children. This could occur 
because she would have relatives caring for her children who would foster this relationship 
during her incarceration. As the legal concept is set forth under UTAH CODE ANN. §62A-4-
201, it is in the best interests and welfare of Fanton's children to be raised under her care 
and supervision. Relatives would care for the children during her incarceration and she 
would then resume their care immediately upon her release. Fanton has a fundamental right 
under the Constitution to sustain a relationship with her children. A.H. at ,It 0. If the 
children went to Michigan and Fanton stayed here with no particular ties to Utah, it would 
impede her relationship with them. 
Fanton's counsel did not raise this matter before the court. He made mention of her 
wanting to serve her sentence in small increments to care for the children but did not ask the 
court to transfer her to Michigan to serve her sentence where she had family to assist with 
the children. Fanton has a constitutional right to raise her children which her attorney did 
not protect. 
Under Houston, to prove counsel was ineffective Fanton must prove that her 
counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment and that she was prejudiced by such performance. Id. at iJ70. His 
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failure to raise the issue of transferring her to Michigan for her children fell below the 
reasonable standard of professional judgment. Id. He failed to protect her constitutional 
rights. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV; J.P. at 1372; see also Qui/Join, 434 U.S. at 255, 98 S.Ct. at 
554-5; see also SA. at ,r 12; A.H. at ,I10. Had he made this request, it likely would have been 
granted and her relationship with her children would have been sustained and maintained. 
Thus, Fanton's counsel was ineffective, and the Judgments should be reversed. 
III. FANTON'$ COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT 
REQUESTING THAT AN ASSESSMENT BE CONDUCTED UPON 
RECEIPT OF THE PSI THAT DISCLOSED FANTON'S MENTAL 
ILLNESS; OR, ALTERNATIVELY, THE TRIAL COURT 
COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN FAILING TO REQUIRE THE 
MANDATORY ASSESSMENT BE CONDUCTED BY AP&P. 
Under State v. Thurston it discusses why a judge should be provided background 
information on the defendant at sentencing as follows: 
Utah law contemplates that the sentencing judge be provided with complete 
background information on the defendant and the crime so that he or she 
might impose a sentence more intelligently. For example, UTAH CODE ANN. 
§64--13-20(1)(b) (1986) (amended 1989) requires the Department of 
Corrections to "provide investigative functions and prepare reports to assist 
the courts in sentencing functions," including the provision for 
"recommendations concerning appropriate measures to be taken on behalf of 
offenders." 
Ibid., 781 P.2d 1296, 1299 (UT App. 1989). UTAH CODE .ANN. §77-18-1.1(2) indicates as 
follows: 
On or after July 1, 2009, the courts of the judicial districts where the Drug 
Offender Reform Act under Section 63M-7-305 is implemented shall, in 
coordination with the local substance abuse authority regarding available 
resources, order offenders convicted of a felony to: (a) participate in a 
screening prior to sentencing; (b) participate in an assessment prior to 
sentencing if the screening indicates an assessment to be appropriate; and (c) 
participate in substance abuse treatment if: (i) the assessment indicates 
treatment to be appropriate; (ii) the court finds treatment to be appropriate for 
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the offender; and (iii) the court finds the offender to be an appropriate 
candidate for community-based supervision. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6a-501 defines "assessment" as follows: 
As used in this part: (a) "Assessment" means an in-depth clinical interview 
with a licensed mental health therapist: (i) used to determine if a person is in 
need of: (A) substance abuse treatment that is obtained at a substance abuse 
program; (B) an educational series; or (C) a combination of Subsections 
(l)(a)(i)(A) and (B); and (ii) that is approved by the Division of Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18-1 (5) states as follows: 
Before the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of 
the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a 
reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence 
investigation report from the department or information from other sources 
about the defendant. (b) The presentence investigation report shall include: 
... (iii) findings from any screening and any assessment of the offender 
conducted under Section 77-18-1.1; ... (6)(a) The department shall provide the 
presentence investigation report to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant 
if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for review, three 
working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence 
investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the 
department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the 
sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an additional 10 working days to 
resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. 
A parties' right to the effective assistance of counsel is discussed in State v. Houston as 
follows: 
The right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution includes "the right to the effective assistance of counsel." In 
Strickland v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court announced the two-
part test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. First, the defendant must 
show that "his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some 
demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment." Second, the defendant must demonstrate 
"that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." We have 
acknowledged "the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel [ and] 
the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal 
defendant." As a result, "we must indulge in a strong presumption that 
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counsel's conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance, and that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy. 
2015 UT 40, ,I70, 353 P.3d 55. ''The party seeking the benefit of the plain error exception 
"must demonstrate that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (tli) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome." Meadow Valley Contradors, Inc. v. State Dept. ofTransp., 2011 UT 35, 
,Il 7,266 P.3d 671. 
Herein, a PSI was prepared for both of Fanton's cases. It indicated that Fanton had 
been diagnosed with PTSD and bi-polar disorder. Although armed with this information, no 
drug or mental assessment was performed or even determined to be unnecessary. Fanton's 
counsel should have noted this information and objected to the PSI, requesting that the 
mandatory assessments be conducted on Fanton prior to sentencing. 
The trial court herein was not provided with complete background information on 
Fanton so as to be able to "impose [her] sentence more intelligently." Thurston at 1299. The 
Department of Corrections has a duty to "provide investigative functions and prepare 
reports to assist the courts in sentencing functions" including conducting assessments where 
it is clear that one is needed. Id. The Drug Offender Reform Act under §63M-7-305 was 
implicated herein requiring that Fanton be submitted to screening prior to sentencing, 
having plead to a felony charge. UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18-1.1(2). It appears some sort of 
screening occurred through AP&P since the PSI indicates the mental health and drug issues 
faced by Fanton; however, there is no indication as to their findings regarding a needed 
assessment or substance abuse treatment and the appropriateness of those resources for 
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Fanton. Id. Having provided insufficient information in the PSI, the trial court was not only 
lacking in complete information to make a more intelligent decision in sentencing Fanton, 
but also unable to find whether treatment or community-based supervision would have been 
appropriate for Fanton or not. 
An in-depth clinical interview with a licensed mental health therapist would have 
been appropriate given the drug charges and Fanton's PTSD and bi-polar disorder. UTAH 
CODE ANN. §41-6a-501(a). Since PTSD and bi-polar can be treated with medication and 
therapy, it was necessary to provide sufficient information to the court as to Fanton's 
existing access to resources during the commission of the crimes to determine her mental 
health impact on having committed them. Thurston at 1299. It is quite possible that the 
results of an assessment would have found Fanton eligible for release into either drug or 
mental health treatment or community-based supervision. UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6a-
501 (a)(i). 
The court was capable of continuing the date for the imposition of sentence if 
Fanton's counsel had spoken up after receiving the PSI about the lack of assessment for his 
client who was diagnosed with PTSD and bi-polar disorder. UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18-1(5). 
The PSI was statutorily required to contain information from other sources about Fanton, 
including any screenings or assessments. Id. However, none were listed in the PSI as having 
occurred. 
Upon receiving the PSI, Fanton's counsel had the duty to review it for inaccuracies, 
immediately contacting AP&P and the State's attorney in an attempt to resolve them. UTAH 
CODE ANN. §77-18-1(6)(a). If no resolution could be reached, the matter should have been 
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presented to the trial court, which court maintained authority to grant an additional 10 
working days to resolve them. Id. However, with it being an assessment that was omitted, it 
likely would have taken a longer period of time than 10 days to conduct the proper 
assessments on Fanton. This is precisely why AP&P is statutorily directed to conduct them 
without court order and include them in the PSI. The PSI was thus rendered deficient by 
them not having done so, with Fanton's counsel egregiously supporting the lack of 
information being presented to the trial court by failing to request it. 
Fanton's right to counsel is protected under the Sixth Amendment. Houston at ,I70. 
Fanton's counsel rendered deficient performance by not requiring AP&P to abide the 
statutes directing that a screening and assessment be conducted on his client who plead to 
drug charges and suffered with a mental illness. Id. The code is clear on this matter; 
however, counsel overlooked it to Fanton's prejudice. Id. Such egregious omission is 
demonstrated by the record wherein Fanton's counsel accepted the PSI, only requesting 
application of credit for time served. Id. This fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment. Id. It is not within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance to allow AP&P to present only partial information, and exclude significant 
information with regard to a client's mental health that could impact sentencing. Id. There is 
no sound trial strategy that would support keeping Fanton's mental health information-
which is by nature mitigating-from a court prior to sentencing. Id. 
Alternatively, the trial court should have recognized the error and corrected it. 
Meadow Valley Conlra1,tors at 1J17. An error clearly existed in failing to hold AP&P to the 
statutes governing the process and contents of Fanton's PSI, upon which the trial court 
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relied heavily herein. Id The trial court is charged with application of the statutory 
requirements pertaining to PSis and sentencing and, upon reviewing the PSI that indicated 
Fanton suffered from a mental illness, should have at a minimum discussed it on the record 
through inquiring of the State why it was absent. Id 
The error should have been obvious to the trial court. Meadow Valley Contrat1ors at 
,I17. Such error significantly harmed Fanton since it had a direct impact on the information 
upon which the trial court relied in sentencing. Id She would likely have been eligible for 
release to treatment, a lesser sentence due to the mitigating circumstances of her mental 
illness (providing her the requested relief of serving 3-4 day increments challenged supra), or 
even a suspension in favor of community-based supervision only. See, UTAH CODE ANN. 
§41-6a-501(a)(i). Instead, Fanton was ordered to serve one year in the county jail, with 
probation to follow. 
Fanton's counsel was aware of her mental illnesses as soon as he looked at the PSI. 
This told him that an assessment needed to be done prior to sentencing. He failed to 
request one. This failure prejudiced Fanton because she was sentenced without any 
accounting of her mental state or how such state may have affected her plea or her 
sentencing. Id. Had her counsel objected and requested an assessment, her mental illness 
would have been addressed in sentencing-as it should have been-providing the court with 
full information to determine her sentence and appropriate treatment. Thus, her counsel 
was ineffective because of his failure to object and request the mandatory assessment under 
the code. Alternatively, the trial court committed plain error in the same regard, having just 
as much knowledge of the omission in the PSI as Fanton's counsel, and being charged with 
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upholding the statutory process for PSis and sentencing. Either way, the Judgments need to 
be reversed and the matter remanded with direction that the PSI be corrected with the 
appropriate assessments conducted and addressing Fanton' s mental health and drug issues. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Fanton respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse both the Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation and 
Restitution, and Commitment, dated April 7, 2015 and the Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of 
Sentence, and Order of Probation dated April 7, 2015, and take any such further action as this 
Court deems necessary. 
DATED this 2nd day of October, 2015. 
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limitation: 8,040 words are contained herein, in compliance with UT. R. APP. P. 24(f)(1)(A) 
and was detennined by the word processing system used to prepare Brief of Appellant. 
DATED this 2nd day of October, 2015. 
~ffeW'o/ 
Matthew Carling 7 
Attorney for Victoria Fanton 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy, postage pre-paid, of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant with attachments, on this 2nd day of October, 2015 to the 
following: 
Utah .Attorney General's Office 
.Attn. Criminal Appellate Division 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 140811 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0811 
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Addendum ,...,,A,...,, 
Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation and 
Restitution, and Commitment, dated April 7, 2015, in Criminal No. 
141500785; Appellate Case No. 20150300, 
and 
Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, and Order of Probation 
dated April 7, 2015, in Criminal No. 141500783; 
Appellate Case No. 20150301. 
G. TYLER ROMERIL (#11954) 
Deputy Iron County Attorney 
82 North 100 East, Suite 201 
P.O. Box428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (435) 865-5310 
\i1 ;rrJ't::ftJ~~. 
The Order of Court is stated below: / 7~:t:~;.~._.;;:~ \ 
Dated: April 07, 2015 /s/ KEITf\ q· . . . · l' 
03:58:36 PM District\.:., ...... " .. • \l 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VICTORIA FANTON, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, STAY OF 
EXECUTION OF SENTENCE, ORDER 
OF PROBATION AND RESTITUTION, 
AND COMMITMENT 
Criminal No. 141500783 
Judge Keith Barnes 
The Defendant, VICTORIA FANTON, having entered a plea of guilty to the offense of 
ROBBERY, a Second-Degree Felony; on January 21, 2015, and the Court having accepted said 
plea of guilty and thereafter having ordered the preparation of a Presentence Investigation 
Report, and after said report was prepared and presented to the Court, the above-entitled matter 
having come on for sentencing on March 24, 2015, in Cedar City, Utah, and the Defendant, 
VICTORIA FANTON, having appeared in person, together with her attorney of record Jeffery E. 
Slack, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through Deputy Iron County Attorney G. 
Tyler Romeril, and the Court having reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report and the file 
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in detail, and thereafter having heard statements from all parties, and the Court being fully 
advised in the premises now makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence, Stay of 
Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation and Restitution, and Commitment as follows: 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, 
VICTORIA FANTON, and pursuant to her plea of guilty, has been convicted of the offense of 
ROBBERY, a Second-Degree Felony; and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had 
anything to say in regard to why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to 
the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as 
charged and convicted. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, VICTORIA FANTON, and pursuant to 
her conviction of ROBBERY, a Second-Degree Felony, shall serve a term of imprisonment for a 
period of one ( 1) to fifteen ( 15) years in the Utah State Prison, and the Defendant is hereby 
placed in the custody of the Utah Department of Corrections. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, VICTORIA FANTON, and pursuant to 
her conviction of ROBBERY, a Second-Degree Felony, shall pay a fine in the sum and amount 
often thousand dollars ($10,000), plus a ninety percent (90%) surcharge, and a court security fee 
in the sum and amount of thirty-three dollars ($33). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sentence imposed herein shall be served 
concurrently with the sentence imposed in Criminal Case No. 141500785. 
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STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the execution of the tenns of incarceration imposed and 
the fines imposed in this case are hereby stayed, pending the Defendant's strict adherence to and 
compliance with the following tenns and conditions of probation. 
ORDER OF PROBATION AND RESTITUTION 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, 
VICTORIA FANTON, is hereby placed on probation for a period of thirty-six (36) months under 
the supervision of the Utah Department of Adult Probation and Parole, strictly within the 
following terms, provisions, and conditions: 
1. The Defendant shall forthwith make and execute a formal agreement provided by 
the Utah Department of Adult Probation and Parole, and during the period of probation set forth 
herein, shall strictly conform with all the terms, provisions, and conditions, and the same are 
hereby made a part of this Order by means of incorporation. 
2. The Defendant shall report as ordered and required by the Court and the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole during the period of this probation. 
3. The Defendant shall commit no law violations during the period of this probation. 
4. The Defendant shall serve a term of incarceration in the Iron County Jail for a 
period of two hundred and seventy (270) days with credit for time served. 
5. The Defendant shall pay a fine and fee in the amount of one thousand five 
hundred dollars ($1,500), plus a court security fee in the amount of thirty-three dollars ($33), 
during the period of probation and under the direction of Adult Probation and Parole. Further, 
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the Defendant may receive credit towards the fine for costs associated with the successful 
completion of a substance abuse evaluation and recommended aftercare, as long as she 
successfully completes probation without any violations. 
6. The Defendant shall pay restitution to the victims in this matter, (1) Suman Singh, 
in the sum and amount of one hundred and ninety-two dollars ($192); and (2) Lindsay Hold, 
Altius Health Plans, in the sum and amount of one hundred and fifty dollars ($150). Said 
restitution to be paid joint and several with the co-Defendants in this matter and paid under the 
direction of Adult Probation and Parole. 
7. The Defendant shall obtain a substance abuse evaluation and file the substance 
abuse evaluation report with the Court within sixty (60) days. Further, the Defendant shall enter, 
complete, and pay for any and all aftercare recommended as a result of said evaluation. 
8. The Defendant shall reimburse Iron County four hundred dollars ($400) for costs 
associated with the public defender. 
9. The Defendant shall not consume or possess illegal narcotics or mind-altering 
substances, including marijuana and any synthetic forms thereof, nor associate with people that 
consume or possess said substances. 
10. The Defendant shall not consume or possess alcohol, nor visit establishments 
where alcohol is the chief item of sale or where consumption of alcohol is the primary activity. 
Further, the Defendant shall not consume or possess energy drinks, other drinks, or medications 
that contain alcohol. 
11. The Defendant shall sign a consent form to release treatment information for any 
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and all treatment providers of mental and/or physical health to the Office of Adult Probation and 
Parole and the Iron County Attorney's Office. 
12. The Defendant shall write a brief plan to be presented to her probation officer 
detailing where she envisions her life 1, 5, and 10 years from now. Said plan to be submitted 
within thirty (30) days. 
13. The Defendant shall maintain full-time employment, be enrolled in school full-
time, or a combination of both, during the period of probation. 
14. The Defendant shall complete twenty (20) hours of community service per week 
if she is unemployed for more that three (3) weeks until full time employment is gained. 
15. The Defendant shall not establish residence outside the State of Utah without an 
approved Interstate Compact or travel outside the State without an approved Travel Permit from 
Adult Probation and Parole. 
16. The Defendant is hereby notified that there shall be zero tolerance for any 
probation violations. 
COMMITMENT 
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH: 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, VICTORIA FANTON, and 
deliver her to the Iron County Jail in Cedar City, Utah, there to be kept and confined in 
accordance with the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, 
Order of Probation and Restitution, and Commitment. 
END OF ORDER 
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G. TYLER ROMERIL (#11954) 
Deputy Iron County Attorney 
82 North 100 East, Suite 201 
P.O. Box428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
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1N THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VICTORIA FANTON, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, STAY OF 
EXECUTION OF SENTENCE, AND 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
Criminal No. 141500785 
Judge Keith Barnes 
The Defendant, VICTORIA FANTON, having entered a plea of guilty to the offense of 
POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Third-Degree Felony; on 
January 21, 2015, and the Court having accepted said plea of guilty and thereafter having 
ordered the preparation of a Presentence Investigation Report, and after said report was prepared 
and presented to the Court, the above-entitled matter having come on for sentencing on March 
24, 2015, in Cedar City, Utah, and the Defendant, VICTORIA FANTON, having appeared in 
person, together with her attorney of record Jeffery E. Slack, and the State of Utah having 
appeared by and through Deputy Iron County Attorney G. Tyler Romeril, and the Court having 
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reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report and the file in detail, and thereafter having heard 
statements from all parties, and the Court being fully advised in the premises now makes and 
enters the following Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, and Order of Probation 
as follows: 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, 
VICTORIA FANTON, and pursuant to her plea of guilty, has been convicted of the offense of 
POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Third-Degree Felony; and the 
Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in regard to why judgment should 
not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the 
Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, VICTORIA FANTON, and pursuant to 
her conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Third-Degree 
Felony, shall serve a term of imprisonment for a period of one ( 1) to fifteen ( 15) years in the 
Utah State Prison, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the Utah Department of 
Corrections. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, VICTORIA FANTON, and pursuant to 
her conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Third-Degree 
Felony, shall pay a fine in the sum and amount often thousand dollars ($10,000), plus a ninety 
percent (90%) surcharge, and a court security fee in the sum and amount of thirty-three dollars 
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($33). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sentence imposed herein shall be setved 
concurrently with the sentence imposed in Criminal Case No. 141500783. 
STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the execution of the terms of incarceration imposed and 
the fines imposed in this case are hereby stayed, pending the Defendant's strict adherence to and 
compliance with the following terms and conditions of probation. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, 
VICTORIA FANTON, is hereby placed on probation for a period of thirty-six (36) months under 
the supetvision of the Utah Department of Adult Probation and Parole, strictly within the 
following terms, provisions, and conditions: 
I. The Defendant shall forthwith make and execute a formal agreement provided by 
the Utah Department of Adult Probation and Parole, and during the period of probation set forth 
herein, shall strictly conform with all the terms, provisions, and conditions, and the same are 
hereby made a part of this Order by means of incorporation. 
2. The Defendant shall report as ordered and required by the Court and the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole during the period of this probation. 
3. The Defendant shall commit no law violations during the period of this probation. 
4. The Defendant shall pay a court security fee in the amount of thirty-three dollars 
($33), during the period of probation and under the direction of Adult Probation and Parole. 
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5. The Defendant shall abide by all terms and conditions of probation as ordered in 
Criminal Case No. 141500783. 
END OF ORDER 
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